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Abstract
In this paper we examine the trade oﬀ between diﬀerent eﬀects of the availabil-
ity of venture capital on the speed of technological progress in an industry. We
consider an evolutionary industry simulation model based on Nelson and Winter
(1982) where R&D eﬀorts of an incumbent ﬁrm generate technological know-how
embodied in key R&D employees, who might use this know-how to found a spinoﬀ
of the incumbent. Venture capital is needed to ﬁnance a spinoﬀ, so that the ex-
pected proﬁts from founding a spinoﬀ depend on how easily venture capital can
be acquired. Accordingly, thick venture capital markets might have two opposing
eﬀects. First, incentives of ﬁrms to invest in R&D might be reduced and, sec-
ond, if spinoﬀ formation results in technological spillovers between the parent ﬁrm
and the spinoﬀs, the generation of spinoﬀ ﬁrms might positively inﬂuence the fu-
ture eﬃciency of the incumbent’s innovation eﬀorts. We study how this tradeoﬀ
inﬂuences the eﬀect of venture capital on innovation expenditures, speed of tech-
nological change and evolution of industry concentration in several scenarios with
diﬀerent industry characteristics.
Keywords: Venture Capital, Technological Progress, R&D Eﬀort, Spinoﬀ, Indus-
try Evolution
1 Introduction
It is well established that economic growth is to a considerable extent driven by tech-
nological change, and therefore understanding the impact of economic factors on the
speed of technological change is important to characterize the factors that foster eco-
nomic growth. Attempts to characterize such factors can be made at diﬀerent levels of
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1aggregation (¯rm-level, industry-level, macroeconomic level). Much work has focused
on the industry level studying patterns of coevolution of industry structure, product
range and employed technology (e.g. Dosi et Al. (1995), Klepper (1996), Malerba and
Orsenigo (1996)). The evolution of many industries is characterized by the emergence
of a few local agglomerations of producers. A major mechanism driving such an evolu-
tion is the entry of start-up ¯rms founded by former high-level employees of incumbent
¯rms (see e.g. Dorfmann (1983), Dahl et Al. (2003), Klepper (2004)). Following Klep-
per (2001), we refer to such entrants as spino® ¯rms. Spino®s have a strong tendency to
locate close to their parent ¯rm (see e.g. Sorenson (2003)) and consequently sequences
of spino® formations yield the generation of geographically concentrated ¯rm clusters.
Furthermore, generation of spino®s by key employees of incumbents is an important
channel of knowledge di®usion. Due to the increased diversity in the industry generated
by spino® entries and the intensive knowledge °ows between ¯rms in local clusters, such
agglomerations have a positive impact on the speed of technological change.
Founding a start-up company requires ¯nancial resources in addition to industry-
relevant know-how. Due to the risky nature of start-up enterprises venture capital plays
a key role for ¯nancing spino® companies. Based on a large data set of venture capital
backed start-up companies Gompers et Al. (2005) observe that about 45% of these
enterprises were spino®s of public companies. They also show that ¯rms that had been
backed by venture capital themselves are more likely to spawn a venture-capital backed
spino® than companies who did not rely on venture capital. Accordingly, the availability
of venture capital in a certain region is an important factor to facilitate the founding
of spino®s of local incumbents and the generation of a local agglomeration of ¯rms.
In addition to the positive e®ect of the emergence of agglomerations for technological
change, the in°ow of venture capital into the industry should have a positive impact by
itself, since additional resources become available to be spent on R&D and innovation
related activities. There is empirical evidence that venture capital investments and
also the availability of venture capital is not uniform across regions (see e.g. Sorenson
and Stuart (2001) or Bottazzi et Al. (2004)) and therefore the availability of venture
capital is an indicator for the economic conditions in a given region. Following the line
of reasoning sketched above, easy access to venture capital is generally considered an
important factor facilitating innovative activity in a region, and technological change1.
However, from the point of view of the parent company the foundation of a spino®
has at least two negative implications. First, key employees leave the company, reducing
the stock of know how embedded in the company2. Second, the spino® is an additional
competitor with a high level of know-how, the generation of which has been ¯nanced
by the parent company. This suggests that, at least if short run e®ects are considered,
parent ¯rms have incentives to keep the key personnel within the ¯rm by o®ering
additional remuneration for these employees. The better the outside options of potential
spino® founders, the higher is the additional remuneration needed to keep key employees
in the ¯rm, and hence the larger is the likelihood that a spino® will actually be founded.
Therefore, on the one hand, the incentives for ¯rms to invest in R&D (generating in
1The amount of early stage venture ¯nancing is, for example, one of the key indicators in the country
reports of the European Innovation Scoreboard published annually by the European Commission.
2Phillips (2002) uses data from Silicon Valley law ¯rms to show that a `parenting event' reduces the
life chances of the parent ¯rm.
2this way know-how embedded in key employees) become smaller the easier potential
entrepreneurs can access venture capital ¯nancing3. On the other hand, in the medium
and long run, the incumbent ¯rm might pro¯t from the existence of a local cluster,
and from the knowledge externalities generated by the activities of the other ¯rms in
the cluster. This is particularly true if the main competitors of the ¯rm are located in
distinct regions or ¯rm clusters.
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on the trade-o® between the direct
and strategic e®ects described above, and to study the in°uence of the availability
of venture capital on incumbent ¯rms' choices of R&D e®ort and on the evolution
of technology and structure of an industry. Clearly, the type of dependency between
availability of venture capital and industry evolution might crucially depend on speci¯c
characteristics of the industry, like the properties of the production technology, demand
conditions, the degree of knowledge orientation, or the intensity of knowledge exchange
between producers. In order to distinguish between di®erent types of industries we
will consider two key aspects. First, the intensity of technological spillovers between
¯rms in the industry that are located in the same geographical region. Second, the
degree of market advantages that established ¯rms have compared to new entrants. To
capture such advantages we consider learning curve e®ects. Marginal production costs
are assumed to decrease as accumulated past output of the ¯rm increases. Although
a classi¯cation of industries along these two dimensions is overly simplistic, we believe
that { by capturing very basic properties of an industry { it allows for general insights
into the main mechanisms responsible for the e®ects of venture capital availability on
the speed of technological change. The main questions we address are:
² For what kind of industries does improved availability of venture capital increase
the speed of technological change?
² For what kind of industries does improved availability of venture capital lead to
higher ¯rm expenditures for innovative activities?
² What is the impact of improved availability of venture capital on the dynamics
of industry concentration and industry pro¯ts?
Since local availability of venture capital is often formulated as an economic policy
goal, gaining insights into these issues also has clear implications for the design of
innovation policy.
In order to deal with the questions posed above we consider a dynamic agent-based
industry simulation model that builds on the evolutionary model of Schumpeterian
competition described in Nelson and Winter (1982). Variations of that model have been
used in the past to study numerous aspects of industry evolution (see Dawid (2006)
3There is some theoretical work on the e®ect of the threat of outgoing technological spillovers due to
employee mobility on ¯rms innovative e®orts. Starting with Pakes and Nitzan (1983) di®erent aspects
of the optimal design and welfare e®ects of contracts for key R&D employees under the threat of exit
of that personnel have been studied (e.g. Anand and Galetovic (2000), Baccara and Razin (2004)).
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) show in a static game theoretic model that potential worker mobility
has negative e®ects on equilibrium investments in innovative activities, and BÄ ohm and Colombo (2006)
point out that in a general equilibrium framework potential worker mobility discourages the adoption
of better technologies by the incumbent ¯rms.
3for a discussion of that stream of literature). In our setup, we consider an industry
where ¯rms located in several distinct industrial clusters produce with heterogenous
technologies for a common market. Initially there is one ¯rm in each cluster, but
additional ¯rms might enter if spino®s emerge from an existing ¯rm in the cluster. There
are technological spillovers within each cluster but none between the di®erent clusters.
Each ¯rm can make investments for (process) innovation to generate new knowledge
and improve its productivity. Productivity can also be improved by imitation of more
productive competitors. Knowledge generated by innovative activities is assumed to
be embodied in a key employee4, and if the innovation is su±ciently substantial such
an employee considers to found a spino®, which will then compete in the market based
on that innovation. In order to do so, however, she needs venture capital. The easier
it is to raise this capital the larger is the fraction of market pro¯ts of the new ¯rm
that can be attained by the spino® founder. If the employee leaves the parent ¯rm,
only a fraction of the knowledge generated through the ¯rm's innovative activities
remains with the incumbent, who would then su®er a reduction in productivity and
pro¯ts. The parent ¯rm can try to prevent the key employee from founding a spino® by
o®ering her a wage increase. The size of the wage premium o®ered and the employee's
decisions whether to accept it depend on the estimated pro¯ts of both sides in case a
spino® is formed, and therefore on the costs for the employee of raising the necessary
venture capital. Estimations of pro¯ts after spino® formation are based on observations
following previous spino® entries.
Firms adapt their decisions concerning expenditures for innovation and imitation
over time, based on the comparison of the productivity gain per unit spent for the two
activities in the past. This simple learning rule of reinforcement type allows to capture
the potential negative e®ect of availability of venture capital on ¯rms' incentives to
invest in innovative activities. Firms exhibit no strategic behavior in a game-theoretic
sense but act strictly rule-based. Nevertheless, this type of model allows us to examine
in a dynamic framework the trade-o® between the static and inter-temporal incentive
e®ects as well as the dynamic externalities due to cluster emergence induced by the
availability of venture capital.
In this paper we restrict the role of venture capital to providing necessary ¯nancial
means for spino® generation. This simpli¯cation ignores several other in°uences of ven-
ture capital ¯nancing, like the facilitation of professionalization measures (see Hellman
and Puri (2002)), which could in°uence relative performance if we considered scenarios
where only a fraction of startups is ¯nanced by venture capital. In our model all new
entries are ¯nanced by venture capital and we do not have to consider such e®ects. On
the other hand, the results we obtain concerning the e®ect of improved availability of
venture capital would also apply to the improvement of any other local resource that
facilitates the generation of spino®s.
In a related paper Colombo and Dawid (2006) have analyzed the impact of availabil-
ity of venture capital on innovative activities of incumbents in a static game-theoretic
framework focusing on the interaction between one incumbent and one potential spino®
founder. Due to the static nature of their analysis neither inter-temporal e®ects of clus-
ter formation nor learning curve e®ects have a role, but the model is very similar to
4This could also be a group of senior employees that considers to leave the ¯rm in order to found a
spino®.
4the one considered here with respect to the structure of the negotiations between the
incumbent and its key employee. A main ¯nding in Colombo and Dawid (2006) is that
higher availability of venture capital has negative e®ects on incumbents' R&D expen-
ditures as long as the venture capital market is relatively thin, but this negative e®ect
disappears as access to venture capital becomes (much) easier. The analysis in this
paper allows us to investigate in how far these ¯ndings are qualitatively robust with
respect to relaxed assumptions of rationality of ¯rms and individuals, and with respect
to a dynamic perspective. This will be done by comparing the insights from Colombo
and Dawid (2006) with the qualitative features of the simulation results for a baseline
case where neither spillovers nor learning curve e®ects are present.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the agent-based simula-
tion model. Simulation results are presented in Section 3, where we distinguish between
four di®erent cases based on presence or absence of spillovers and learning curve e®ects.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
2 The Model
We consider a dynamic industry model based on the evolutionary model of Schum-
peterian competition developed by Nelson and Winter (see Nelson and Winter (1982)).
Using this kind of model implies that we abstract from product innovations and restrict
attention to productivity increasing process innovations. On the one hand, this focus is
certainly debatable, in particular because the motivation for a large fraction of spino®s
is the production of a new product not o®ered by the parent. On the other hand, the
main competition e®ect we like to capture { i.e. that spino® generation reduces the
incumbents pro¯t in the short run { is captured in this formulation. Furthermore, deal-
ing with product innovations would require to consider a substantially more involved
demand structure and more re¯ned innovation strategies.
2.1 Production and Technical Change
The industry consists of Nt producers o®ering a homogenous good. Time is discrete
and the number of producers might change over time due to the creation of new ¯rms
(see below).
As in Nelson and Winter (1982), we assume that each ¯rm produces with constant
returns to scale and ¯xed input coe±cients, where the output quantity is determined
by the size and productivity of the current capital stock. Therefore, the output of ¯rm
i in period t reads
Qit = KitAit;
where Kit ¸ 0 denotes the size of the capital stock of ¯rm i at t, and the productivity
of capital, Ait > 0, is determined by the technology currently used by ¯rm i. The
total output Qt =
PNt
i=1 Qit induces the market price by the iso-elastic inverse demand
function
pt = p(Qt) :=
®
Qt
; ® > 0:
Production costs are given by CitKit, where
Cit = (1 ¡ ´)nitc;








The corresponding unit costs read CitKit
Qit =
(1¡´)nit¯
Ait . For ´ > 0 there are learning-
curve e®ects implying that every doubling of aggregate output leads to the reduction
of the unit costs of production by the factor 1 ¡ ´ (see e.g. Alchian (1963)). Such
learning curve e®ects might be driven by a reduction of the amount of complementary
input factors (e.g. labor) that is needed per unit of capital. As pointed out in the
Introduction, the existence of learning curve e®ect is considered as a proxy for more
general market advantages for incumbents compared to new entrants. Apart from
learning curve e®ects, such advantages might for example be due to advantageous
conditions with suppliers or distributors, scale e®ects, or consumer loyalty.
Firms can improve the productivity of capital by means of innovation or imitation.
We denote by Xim
it ¯rm i's expenditures per unit of capital for imitation e®orts in
period t and by Xin
it expenditures per capital for innovation. Both types of e®orts
are assumed to have uncertain success, where the probabilities of successful imitation,
respectively innovation, are given by
IP(Imit = 1) = aimXim
it Kit
IP(Init = 1) = ainXin
it Kit + q
spill
it :
Here Imit and Init are binary variables indicating the success of ¯rm i's e®orts in period
t and aim;ain > 0 are su±ciently small to keep the expressions for the success proba-
bilities in the unit interval. The term q
spill
it captures incoming technological spillovers
for ¯rm i. We assume that a ¯rm can obtain spillovers only from competitors in its
own industrial cluster. The cluster of ¯rm i, denoted by Cit, consists of all ¯rms that
are either direct or indirect parents, or direct or indirect spino®s of ¯rm i (see below).
The size of the spillovers depends on the innovation e®orts of all other ¯rms in the
cluster, where the e®ect of technological spillovers on a ¯rm's success probability is a
concave increasing function of the knowledge generated by the competitors' innovation
expenditures. The upper bound of the success probability generated by spillovers is
















where ½ 2 [0;1]. As in Nelson and Winter (1982), successful imitation means that
¯rm i adopts the best technology that is currently used in the industry, whereas the
productivity of a new technology stemming from a successful innovation is a stochastic
variable with expected value equal to the ¯rm's current productivity. We denote the
productivity resulting from successful imitation by Amax
t = max [Aitji = 1;:::;Nt].
The productivity of the new technology arising from a successful innovation is denoted
by ~ Ai;t and follows a Gaussian distribution with mean Ai;t and variance ¾2.
62.2 Radical Innovations and Potential Spino® Formation
If a successful innovation e®ort of a ¯rm leads to an improved productivity ~ Ait >
Amax
t + º for a given º > 0, we call this a radical technological innovation. In this
case the key R&D personnel of the ¯rm considers to use the acquired knowledge in
order to found a separate producing ¯rm. If such a spino® is indeed generated, the
new ¯rm j enters the industry with capital stock Kj;t = Kini, and productivity of
capital of Aj;t+1 = ~ Ait. In such a case the parent company looses the tacit knowledge
of the leaving R&D personnel and therefore cannot fully exploit the newly developed
technology. Productivity of capital only increases to the level
Ai;t+1 = ^ Ai;t := Ait + ¹( ~ Ait ¡ Ait):
On the other hand, if no spino® is formed { which is always true if innovation activities
are not successful, or the innovation is not radical { the productivity of ¯rm i in the
following period is given by
Ai;t+1 = max[Ait;ImitAmax
t ;Init ~ Ait]:
Spino®s are ¯nanced by venture capital, which we assume to imply that for the ¯rst
¿ periods of existence the newly founded ¯rm is not subject to ¯nancial constraints
on investments. Founders of the spino® and venture capitalists split the pro¯ts of the
new ¯rm, with a fraction ° of pro¯ts going to the founders. The parameter ° is a
proxy for the bargaining power of the potential spino® founders when negotiating with
the venture capitalists. The larger the supply of venture capital on the market the
larger should the bargaining power of the spino® founder be. Hence, a scenario with
few sources of venture capital corresponds to a small value of °, whereas a large °
corresponds to a thick venture capital market. The spino® ¯rm is added to the cluster
of the parent ¯rm, which becomes now also the cluster of the spino® ¯rm.
In order to prevent its R&D personnel from forming a spino®, the mother company
can o®er additional bonus payments. The size of the bonus is determined by bilateral
bargaining, where the disagreement payo® for the employees is given by their share of
estimated future pro¯ts if the spino® is formed, and the disagreement payo® for the
¯rm is given by its expected pro¯t/losses in case the spino® enters the market. In
particular, denote by ¹ ¼Sp(t) the average per-period pro¯t per unit of capital in the
time interval [t ¡ ¿;t ¡ 1] made by all spino®s that have been in existence for more
than ¿ periods. Furthermore, denote by ¹ Kt the average capital stock of all ¯rms in
period t. The potential spino® founders estimate the per-period pro¯t potential of their
spino®, once it is established, as ¹ ¼Sp(t) ¹ Kt and therefore estimate their payo®s in case
of disagreement as
bmin = °¹ ¼Sp(t) ¹ Kt:
They will not accept any bonus below this level. At the same time, the ¯rm estimates
its next period pro¯ts in case a spino®, respectively no spino®, is formed as
^ ¼
Sp
















i;t+1 in general di®er be-
cause of the di®erences in learning curve e®ects induced by di®erent output quantities.
Note that this estimation is based on naive expectations with respect to the total output
of all competitors. The maximal bonus the ¯rm would be willing to accept is
bmax = ^ ¼
Sp
it ¡ ^ ¼
NSp
it :
If we assume that the actual bonus is determined by the Nash Bargaining solution of
this bargaining problem with bargaining power » for the ¯rm, we obtain that a spino®
is formed whenever bmin > bmax. If bmin · bmax no spino® is formed and the bonus
reads
bit+s = »bmin + (1 ¡ »)bmax; » 2 [0;1]; s = 1;:::d:
The ¯rm commits to pay this bonus to R&D employees each period from t+1 to t+d.
After period t+d the innovation has been absorbed by the ¯rm and the special role of
this employee vanishes.
2.3 Capital Accumulation, Savings and External Financing
Pro¯ts per unit of capital are denoted by ¼it and read
¼it = ptAit ¡ Cit ¡ Xim
it ¡ Xin
it ¡ bi;t:
In the case pro¯ts are positive, a fraction ¸ is distributed as dividends. Not distributed




Si;t¡1 + (1 ¡ ¸)¼it ¡ Iit ¼it ¸ 0
Si;t¡1 + ¼it ¡ Iit ¼it < 0:
Capital is assumed to depreciate at a rate ± > 0 for all ¯rms, i.e.
Ki;t+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kit + IitKit:
The investment of ¯rms is determined, on the one hand, by the their intended
investment pattern and, on the other hand, by ¯nancial constraints. Following Nelson
and Winter (1982), the intended investment per unit of capital of ¯rm i is given by
^ Iit = max
·





where MSit = Qit=
PNt
j=1 Qjt denotes the market share of ¯rm i, and PCit = (ptAit)=Cit
its price-cost ratio. All ¯rms other than startups ¯nanced by venture capital ¯nance
investments by pro¯ts plus savings. If a ¯rm cannot cover the intended net investments
by pro¯ts plus savings it can however obtain external ¯nancing as long as pro¯ts are
positive. Similar to Nelson and Winter (1982)we assume that ¯nancial constraints for
investments are given by
f(¼it) =
(
Sit + ± + ¼it ¼it < 0
Sit + ± + 3:5¼it ¼it ¸ 0:
8and actual investments read
Iit = min[^ Iit;f(¼it)]:
Financial constraints for investments are never binding for the ¯rst ¿ periods of oper-
ation of spino® companies that are ¯nanced by venture capital. In these cases we have
Iit = ^ Iit.
2.4 Adaptation of Strategies
Firms adapt their strategies concerning investments for imitative and innovative ac-
tivities over time. The spirit of the used adaptation rule is similar to reinforcement-
learning. A ¯rm updates Xim
it and Xin
it after every period in which it had either a
successful imitation or innovation, based on the relative average returns on the two
types of investment. We denote by ¢in
it and ¢im
it ¯rm i's estimates of the returns on in-
vestment for innovation and imitation investments. These estimates remain unchanged
from one period to the next if the corresponding activity had no success in that period.
Assume that ¯rm i realized a successful innovation in period t ¡ 1 and that the last
successful innovation before that was in period t ¡ k. Then, based on a comparison of
the pro¯tability of the innovation and the total investments needed to generate it, the
estimated return on investment for innovations is updated to
¢in
it =





Analogously, if a successful imitation occurred in t ¡ 1 the return on investment for








If an innovation or imitation occurred in t¡1, the ¯rm compares the updated return on
investment with that of the competing activity. The investments for the activity with
the higher estimated return are increased by a given percentage, whereas investments
for the activity with the lower estimated return are reduced. We have:
Xin
i;t+1 = (1 ¡ ²)Xin
it
Xim







i;t+1 = (1 + ²)Xin
it
Xim






In Figure 1 we give an overview over the sequence of activities in a given period t.
3 Results
3.1 Simulation Setup
All reported results are based on batches of 50 simulation runs with T = 200 periods
for each parameter constellation. To check whether a change in the parameter setting
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Figure 1: Sequence of events in a given period t
10has signi¯cant e®ects on the means over the 50 runs of some considered variables, we
have backed our qualitative statements with Wilcoxon signed rank tests, typically using
a signi¯cance level of 0.95. For the Wilcoxon tests, we have stochastically generated
50 parameter pro¯les. The ranges of all parameters and a list of all hypotheses tested
are given in the Appendix. In particular, all qualitative statements concerning mono-
tonicity of productivity with respect to ° have been con¯rmed using a Wilcoxon test
to compare scenarios with ° = 0, ° = 0:5 and ° = 1. The main focus of our analysis
is on the interplay of the parameters °, indicating the availability of venture capital,
´, determining the strength of the learning curve e®ect, and ¯, the spillover intensity.
For the sake of clearer illustration, in all tables and ¯gures we consider the following
default parameter set:
® = 100 aim = 0:125 ain = 0:125
c = 0:16 ¾ = 0:02 ¸ = 0:2
² = 0:1 ± = 0:03 º = 0:02
¹ = 0 » = 0:5 ¿ = 10
d = 10 Xim
i0 = 0:005 Xin
i0 = 0:005
Ki0 = 89:7 Kini = 10 ½ = 0:15
As far as technological spillovers and learning curve e®ects go, we consider four
scenarios: i) neither e®ect is present; ii) positive learning curve e®ects, no spillovers;
iii) positive spillovers, no learning curve e®ects; iv) both e®ects are present. In consid-
eration of the main questions posed in the Introduction we report for each of the four
scenarios the impact of the availability of venture capital on the following key variables:







































t denote total capital stock, respectively total output, in the
industry at time t.
3.2 The Baseline Case
We ¯rst consider a scenario without knowledge externalities within a cluster, and with-
out learning curve e®ects. Figure 2 illustrates, for T = 200 periods, some basic patterns
of the dynamics arising in the model, showing the trajectories of productivity and mar-
ket share of all ¯rms for one example of a run with low availability (° = 0:25), and one
11example of a run with high availability (° = 0:75) of venture capital. The trajectories























































































































































´ = 0) with ° = 0:75 (panels (a) and (c)) and with ° = 0:25 (panels (b) and (d))
Several observations can be made based on the ¯gure. As far as the evolution of
productivity goes, the observed pattern of small stepwise technological improvements
by single ¯rms with relatively fast imitation by the competitors is quite familiar from
previous analysis of Nelson-Winter type models. With the exception of a few laggards,
the variance of the productivity of ¯rms stays small. As it is to be expected, the
number of spino®s is larger in the case where venture capital is more readily available.
Considering market shares, it can be seen that spino®s quickly acquire substantial
market shares and are able to keep these shares after venture capital ¯nancing expires.
Furthermore, a clear negative e®ect on the market share of the mother ¯rm of the
spino® can be seen, such that the positive e®ect of the foundation of a spino® on the
total market share of all ¯rms in that cluster is only minor.
Comparing panels (a) and (b) one observes that productivity after T periods is
larger for ° = 0:25 than for ° = 0:75. At ¯rst sight, this is rather surprising since a
12larger number of spino®s means that a larger amount of venture capital has °own into
the industry, which should increase total revenues and accordingly total expenditures
for innovation. On the other hand, the strategic analysis in Colombo and Dawid (2006)
suggest that increased availability of venture capital reduces incentives for ¯rms to
invest in innovative activities. Before we explore this type of explanation, we have to
verify that the observation in these two single runs corresponds to a robust general
e®ect. In Table 1 we give the median values over 50 runs of the average productivity
in the industry after T periods for nine equally spaced values of ° 2 [0;1]5. It can be
° 0 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875 1
¹ AT 0.45 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.4
Table 1: Median values of average productivity in the industry after T periods for
¯ = ´ = 0.
seen that, for small °, the average productivity ¹ AT is decreasing for increasing °, but
becomes virtually constant in the region of high availability of venture capital. Although
the di®erences in the median are small, the di®erence in the ¹ AT values between the
runs with ° = 0 and those with ° = 1 is statistically signi¯cant at the 95% level. To
check whether the negative e®ect of the availability of venture capital on productivity is
indeed due to the reduced incentives to invest in innovation, we illustrate in Figure 3 the
average expenditures for innovation and imitation per capital unit in the industry. It
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Figure 3: Average innovation expenditures (a) and imitation expenditures (b) per unit
of capital for ¯ = ´ = 0.
can be clearly seen that as ° increases ¯rms shift their activities more towards imitation,
and reduce their expenditures for innovation. Again, this phenomenon disappears as °
5For the extreme case ° = 1, spino® founders obtain venture capital without any sharing of pro¯ts.
Obviously, this is not a realistic scenario and should be considered as a theoretical benchmark only.
13becomes large. This might be due to the fact that for large values of ° almost every
radical innovation results in the generation of a spino®. Under the assumption that
no potential spino® founder will be kept in the ¯rm by bonus payments, the actual
value of ° does no longer in°uence the payo® of the incumbent ¯rm, and therefore
also not its incentives to invest in innovative activities. These observations match
very well the ¯ndings concerning innovation incentives in Colombo and Dawid (2006).
In that respect it should be noted that, contrary to Colombo and Dawid (2006), in
our settings ¯rms do not act strategically and do not build estimations about future
returns on investment. Nevertheless, the relevant strategic aspects are captured in this
evolutionary model with simple reinforcement-type learning behavior of ¯rms.
Figure 4(a) shows that average ¯rm pro¯ts decrease for increasing values of °. The
strong e®ect of ° on industry concentration (Figure 4(b)) suggests that the main driver
of this phenomenon is not the negative e®ect of ° on average productivity, but rather
the increased competition due to the larger number of spino® ¯rms.


















Figure 4: Average ¯rm pro¯ts (a) and industry concentration (b) at period T for
¯ = ´ = 0.
3.3 The Impact of Learning Curve E®ects
Learning curve e®ects imply comparative cost advantages for incumbents compared to
spino® ¯rms. Hence, one could expect that incentives to form spino®s are reduced even
if venture capital is readily available and the negative e®ect of ° on the innovation
incentives are smaller than in the baseline case. It turns out that quite the opposite
is true. In Figure 5 we compare innovation and imitation expenditures depending on
° for ´ = 0;0:05;0:1 and ¯ = 0. It can be seen that the negative e®ect of ° on
innovation expenditures becomes stronger if there are positive learning curve e®ects.
A possible explanation for this pattern is that the bonus ¯rms have to pay in order to
prevent the formation of a spino® after a radical innovation does not only depend on the
potential pro¯ts of the spino®s but also on the expected losses by the incumbent. Given
that, on average, incumbents face lower per unit costs the stronger the learning curve
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Figure 5: Average innovation expenditures ¹ Xin
T and imitation expenditures ¹ Xim
T per
unit of capital for ´ = 0 (solid line), ´ = 0:05 (dashed line) and ´ = 0:1 (dotted line);
¯ = 0.
e®ects, strong learning curve e®ects imply that the negative impact on pro¯ts of the
productivity losses implied by the formation of a spino® is strong. Consequently, the
larger ´ is, the higher are the bonus payments needed to prevent spino® formation. This
e®ect increases the incentives of ¯rms to acquire technology by subsequent imitation
rather than preventing spino® formation, which determines a shift of expenditures
towards imitative activities. This shift becomes stronger the more likely it is that a
spino® will form. For ´ = 0:1 and ° = 1 ¯rms on average spend three times as much
for imitation than for innovation.
The impact of positive learning curve e®ects on productivity, pro¯ts and industry
concentration is now quite obvious (see Figure 6). As it is to be expected, increasing
learning curve e®ects yield an upward shift of the lines indicating average pro¯ts and
industry concentration. This induces an increase in average expenditures for innovation
and imitation, and therefore also in average productivity. With respect to the impact
of changes in the availability of venture capital, we observe that the addition of learning
curve e®ects does not qualitatively alter the observations made for the baseline case,
but rather reinforces these phenomena. Productivity, pro¯ts and industry concentration
decrease if ° goes up.
3.4 The Impact of Technological Spillovers
If there are technological spillovers within a cluster ¯rms pro¯t from innovative activ-
ities of the other enterprises in the cluster. Taking this externality into account, the
formation of a spino® has an inter-temporal positive e®ect for the incumbent, in addi-
tion to the negative e®ects due to current knowledge losses and increased competition.
We study the impact of this positive inter-temporal e®ect by comparing the baseline
case with scenarios where the spillover parameter is increased to ¯ = 0:2 and ¯ =
0:4, but no learning curve e®ects are present. As shown in Figure 7, the presence of




































Figure 6: Average productivity (a), average pro¯ts (b) and industry concentration (c)
after T periods for ´ = 0 (solid line), ´ = 0:05 (dashed line) and ´ = 0:1 (dotted line);
¯ = 0.
16technological spillovers substantially changes the impact of the availability of venture
capital on the balance between innovation and imitation expenditures. We now observe
that expenditures for innovation increase, whereas expenditures for imitation decrease
as ° becomes larger. For ¯ = 0:4 and ° = 1, ¯rms spend almost twice as much for
innovation than for imitation. Due to the spillovers, on average, ¯rms in large clusters
have to spend less own funds in order to generate a successful innovation. Therefore,
the return on investment for innovation in large cluster is comparatively large and ¯rms
shift expenditures from imitation to innovation.
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Figure 7: Average innovation expenditures ¹ Xin
T and imitation expenditures ¹ Xim
T per
unit of capital for ¯ = 0 (solid line), ¯ = 0:2 (dashed line) and ¯ = 0:4 (dotted line);
´ = 0.
The shift of expenditures towards innovative activities improves the speed of tech-
nological change. Figure 8 shows that, with positive technological spillovers, an increase
in the availability of venture capital has a positive impact on average productivity. This
does not translate into a positive impact of ° on average ¯rm pro¯ts due to decreased
industry concentration and increased intensity of competition induced by an increase
in °. In particular, for large values of ° the industry reaches a signi¯cantly higher
productivity than in the baseline case, but average ¯rm pro¯ts for ¯ = 0:4 are less than
50% of those realized when ¯ = 0. The main reason for this observation is that, when
there are spillovers, more (radical) innovations are developed, and more spino®s are
founded. Thus in the presence of spillovers industry concentration becomes smaller,
which has a negative e®ect on pro¯ts. The inspection of individual simulation runs
shows that although the ¯nal concentration of the industry is rather small for large
values of °, typically a dominant cluster emerges and all ¯rms that end up having a
signi¯cant market share are members of this cluster. Also a ¯rm that is founded rela-
tively late in the dominant cluster may become one of the leading producers. This is
quite in contrast with the scenarios with learning curve e®ects and no spillovers, where
inspection of single runs shows that the industry is typically dominated by incumbents
and early spino®s.
Although the focus of our analysis is on the evolution of productivity, industry




































Figure 8: Average productivity (a), average pro¯ts (b) and industry concentration (c)
after T periods for for ¯ = 0 (solid line), ¯ = 0:2 (dashed line) and ¯ = 0:4 (dotted
line); ´ = 0.
18structure and ¯rms' innovation strategies, we can now also brie°y discuss consumer
surplus. To do so, note that there is a strong positive relationship between total industry
output and the parameter °, which is the result of increasing average productivity
and increasing intensity of competition. Accordingly, the price of the consumption
good decreases as ° increases, meaning that improved availability of venture capital
decreases average ¯rm pro¯ts, but improves the speed of technological change and
consumer surplus.
3.5 The Interplay of Learning Curve E®ects and Technological Spillovers
In the previous subsections we have shown, on the one hand, that the qualitative impact
of an increase of ° on expenditures for innovation and on the speed of technological
change di®ers signi¯cantly depending on whether technological spillovers and learning
curve e®ects are present or not. On the other hand, the e®ect of an increase in °
on pro¯ts and industry concentration is always negative. Therefore, we should expect
a negative impact of ° on these two variables also if both e®ects are simultaneously
present. Furthermore, in this case the dependency of average productivity and average
innovation expenditures on ° will in general depend on the relative strength of the two
e®ects and can be non-monotonous. In particular, there might be an interior value of
° that maximizes the speed of technological change in the industry. To illustrate this
point, we show in Figure 9 the dependence on ° of average productivity and average
innovation expenditures for the parameter setting ¯ = 0:2;´ = 0:05.
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Figure 9: Average productivity (a) and average innovation expenditures after T periods
for ´ = 0:05 and ¯ = 0:2.
Although the strategic e®ect is large enough to generate a negative relationship be-
tween ° and innovation expenditures, the additional knowledge externalities generated
by increased spino® formations are su±ciently strong for the average productivity to be
increasing for small values of °. Also in this case, the di®erence in average productivity
between the runs with ° = 0 and those with ° = 1 is statistically signi¯cant. The
highest median of average productivity values is reached for ° = 0:5. Hence, in such
19a scenario there can be both too much venture capital and too little venture capital.
More substantial statements could only be made with particular industries in mind
where the relative strength of the two e®ects considered here could be estimated. Such
an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Conclusions
The agenda of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the interplay of di®erent
e®ects generated by the availability of venture capital on the speed of technological
change and on the evolution of an industry. The two main e®ects under consideration
are a positive direct e®ect (i.e., that venture capital facilitates the emergence of indus-
trial clusters and therefore generates positive externalities through local technological
spillovers), and a negative incentive e®ect (i.e., that venture capital improves the out-
side option of potential spino® founders, which reduces the expected return on R&D
investments for incumbents).
Based on the results of our industry simulations we conclude that which of these two
e®ects dominates depends crucially on the characteristics of the industry considered. In
particular, if there are no knowledge °ows between spino®s and their parent companies
after the spino®s have been found, the e®ect of the additional innovation expenditures
funded by the capital °owing into the industry is outweighed by the downward adapta-
tion of innovation intensities by the incumbent ¯rms. Easier access to venture capital
by potential spino® founders induces slower growth of the average productivity in the
industry. The presence of learning curve e®ects or other comparative advantages for
incumbents reinforces this phenomenon since prevention of spino® formation becomes
(very) costly and the focus of incumbents shifts towards imitative activities. If there
are su±ciently strong technological spillovers between parents and spino®s after spino®
formation, the negative relationship between innovation intensity and venture capi-
tal availability disappears. Based on past experience, ¯rms anticipate future positive
e®ects of an increase in their cluster due to spino® formation, and these e®ects out-
weigh the reduced appropriability of innovations due to thicker venture capital markets.
If spillover e®ects are not so strong, innovation intensities diminish as venture capital
markets become thicker but, due to increased knowledge externalities, average industry
productivity still goes up.
Although the approach of this paper is a theoretical one and we do not intend to
capture the structure of any particular industry with our model6, our ¯ndings yield
testable conjectures about the relationship between venture capital investments, num-
ber of spino®s, innovation intensity, and productivity growth in di®erent types of in-
dustries. We plan to empirically test these conjectures in future work.
6Examples of a very speci¯c simulation model of the evolution and spino® formation in a particular
industry, the PC industry, are given by Malerba et Al. (1999, 2001).
20Appendix
We test our results for robustness by means of a parameter sensitivity test. We ran-
domly generate 50 di®erent pro¯les of the parameters given in Table 3. Each parameter
is drawn from a bounded uniform distribution (its speci¯ed range can be seen in Table
3). Table 2 shows the remaining parameters, which determine the basic structure of
our model and are therefore ¯xed.
Each particular setting for our control parameters is run over all 50 pro¯les. All
results are found to be very robust under all settings, namely 50 di®erent runs with
pro¯les based on the shown parameter ranges.









Table 3: Model parameters and their respective ranges.













21The following tables show the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. We test
whether the medians for ¹ Xin
T , the average innovation costs per capital after 200 periods,
¹ Xim
T , the average imitation costs per capital after 200 periods, and ¹ AT, the productivity
after 200 periods, are the same for ° = 0 and ° = 1 (Table 4), for ° = 0 and ° = 0:5
(Table 5) and, ¯nally, for ° = 0:5 and ° = 1 (Table 6). The null hypothesis is that
the two samples are drawn from a single population, and therefore that the means are
equal. The "* " labels indicate that the null can be rejected at a 95 percent level, while
n.s. means that the null hypothesis can not be rejected at that signi¯cance level. The
signs in brackets hint at the direction of the di®erence between the means.
Table 4: Results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the case ° = 0 versus ° = 1.




¯ = ´ = 0 ¤(>) ¤(<) ¤(>)
¯ = 0:2;´ = 0 ¤(<) ¤(>) ¤(<)
¯ = 0:4;´ = 0 ¤(<) ¤(>) ¤(<)
¯ = 0;´ = 0:05 ¤(>) ¤(<) ¤(>)
¯ = 0;´ = 0:1 ¤(>) n:s: ¤(>)
¯ = 0:2;´ = 0:05 ¤(>) n:s: ¤(<)
Table 5: Results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the case ° = 0 versus ° = 0:5.




¯ = ´ = 0 ¤(>) n:s: ¤(>)
¯ = 0:2;´ = 0 ¤(<) ¤(>) ¤(<)
¯ = 0:4;´ = 0 ¤(<) ¤(>) ¤(<)
¯ = 0;´ = 0:05 ¤(>) n:s: ¤(>)
¯ = 0;´ = 0:1 ¤(>) n:s: ¤(>)
¯ = 0:2;´ = 0:05 ¤(>) n:s: ¤(<)
22Table 6: Results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the case ° = 0;5 versus ° = 1.




¯ = ´ = 0 n:s n:s: n:s:
¯ = 0:2;´ = 0 n:s: n:s: ¤(<)
¯ = 0:4;´ = 0 n:s: n:s: ¤(<)
¯ = 0;´ = 0:05 n:s: n:s: n:s:
¯ = 0;´ = 0:1 n:s: n:s: n:s:
¯ = 0:2;´ = 0:05 n:s: n:s: n:s:
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